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C OFFEE is the most important tradablecrop for 25 million smallholders in 60tropical countries. Coffee growing is
part of specific global commodity chains,
which are border-crossing value-added crea-
ting networks of producers, traders and service
providers, whose end result is the use of a fi-
nished commodity [Gereffi, Korzeniewicz and
Korzeniewicz 1994]. They process the coffee
berries picked manually into exportable green
coffee beans, which are transformed into a
roasted, ground and packed final good powder,
to be consumed as a brew by cup.
The crop suffers from market imbalances and
has a long history of private and public actions
to reach equilibrium without lasting success.
After profound and persisting price crises in the
1990s, there are now far-reaching proposals to
reform the world coffee market with the imple-
mentation of a long-term strategy to reduce
coffee areas. This may cause welfare disasters
among coffee cultivators and mismatches with
long-run consumers preferences.
Introduction
The global commodity chain is a globalization
metaphor to explain the income generation and
distribution by international production activi-
ties and to design policies to improve the re-
sults. A key issue in our methodology is the
identification and explanation of the gover-
nance structure that controls the chain and de-
termines in great part how resources and gains
are allocated, who may participate and under
what conditions. Because of the increasing
demand-driven nature of the coffee chains,
we use a chain reversal approach that starts
from the consumer and goes through the dif-
ferent nodes to raw material exploitation at the
growers’ end.
Control is executed through market power
and coordination between firms in different
segments or between external (as NGOs, go-
vernments) and internal parties in the chain
[Muradian and Pelupessy 2005: 2031]. Coor-
dination is the exchange of extra-market infor-
mation, capabilities and activities between
parties (within or outside the chain) not linked
through ownership. This is meant to ensure
particular product specifications, perfor-
mances, processes and logistics. When buyers
in developed economies interact with suppliers
from developing ones, coordination is needed
to get reliable transactions in cases of high
risks, heterogeneous production conditions,
technological backwardness and unstable fi-
nancial systems [Hobbs and Young 2001].
Recent publications have given important
insights into the structure and functioning of
coffee chains [Talbot 2004; Daviron and Ponte
2005], but the nature and impact of the
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sequence of the imperfect or non-competitive
markets in the chains should be more explicitly
considered.
The purpose of this article is to examine the
nature and outcome of coffee market structures
in order to explain the analytics of chain go-
vernance and its consequences for value crea-
tion and distribution. This will be useful for
policy design to reach a more balanced deve-
lopment of the industry. Section 1 will pay at-
tention to the structure and performance of
consumers’ markets in developed economies.
Section 2 treats the international markets of
green coffee, and the national ones where
coffee berries are traded in tropical countries,
will be discussed in section 3. The impact of
the governance structure, public and private
coordinations in the coffee chain will be
treated in section 4, while a concluding sec-
tion 5 will finalize the work.
Differentiated consumers’ markets
Today more than 7 million tons of green coffee
equivalents are consumed yearly: 26% in the
producing countries and 74% in the importing
non-producing ones. In the 2000s average
consumption per head has reached 4.6 kilo-
grams in the Western markets and a mere
0.7 kilograms in coffee producing countries.1
The European Union (15) with 42% of world
consumption is the biggest block, then follow
the United States and Japan with respectively
24 and 9%.
In most saturated and mature markets
(> 5 kg per capita) trends are negative or stable
(France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden),
while in Southern Europe (Italy) these are in-
creasing. The emerging markets of Brazil and
Costa Rica are the only developing countries
with similar coffee consumption per head,
slightly higher than the United States or Japan.2
In saturated markets as Sweden the average is
3.5 cups daily in 2005 or 6 cups a coffee
drinker a day (75% of the population over 15
as in Norway).3
The only possibility for growth is to expand
the number of coffee drinkers. Coffee consump-
tion is habit creating as tested for the United
States with a rational addiction model [Olekalns
and Bardsley 1996]. It turned out that current
use increases future desirability, which may ex-
plain the low negative price elasticities of de-
mand between 0.2 and 0.4. The long run
elasticities are, in absolute terms higher than the
short run ones [Singh et al. 1977; Akyama and
Duncan 1982; Vogelgang 1988; Bettendorf and
Verboven 2000; Feuerstein 2001].
QUALITY ATTRIBUTES
In the main consumers’ countries income elas-
ticities are smaller than 1, because of market
saturation and other negatively impacting fac-
tors as tea or soft drinks habits, increasing
income inequality and health concerns. Never-
theless, final consumers’ markets have a
1. Foreign Agricultural Service, December 2006: “Tro-
pical poducts: world markets and trade,” Washington
DC.
2. Foreign Agricultural Service/United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, circular series 2004 and 2006: “Tro-
pical poducts: world markets and trade,” Washington
DC.





dynamic nature because of the widespread first
wave of differentiations and the willingness of
consumers to pay premiums for higher qualities.
These were traditionally based on intrinsic or
sensorial quality attributes, such as body, acidity
and aroma [Boot 2002]. The characteristics are
specified by geographical location, altitude and
performance of the coffee cultivation, harves-
ting, processing and blending practices.
Each country has its own taste preferences
and roasters adapt to these by offering coffee
blends or mélanges. There are great differences
in the composition of coffee varieties imported
by consuming countries. The United States im-
ports are for about 40% Other Milds mainly
from Central America and Mexico, because of
political reasons and relatively low transport
costs. The blends in Sweden and Japan are
higher quality Colombian Milds intensive
complemented with Other Milds (both > 40%),
because of the sophisticated tastes of very
wealthy consumers. Eastern European coun-
tries, Spain, France and Italy use more than
75% Robustas and Unwashed Arabica.4 Lower
per capita incomes, but also espresso popula-
rity in Italy, France and Spain play a part in it
and this may create market opportunities for
low quality coffee producers. The blending and
roasting intensity provide much of the parti-
cular taste to a coffee brew.
A pyramid of blends gives each variety and
quality its own place: a tastemaker, which is a
small but highly priced top of Colombian and
high quality Other Milds (e.g. SHG or high
altitude coffee from Costa Rica); a larger
complementary part made of lower quality
Other Milds (lowland coffee from Nicaragua
and Costa Rica) and Unwashed Arabica
(Brazil); and the filler with an even greater
share of Unwashed Arabica and Robusta
(Uganda, Vietnam). The precise composition
of a blend is a well-kept business secret and
entry barrier. Substitution with cheaper varie-
ties may take place as long as the taste of the
particular blend will not change notably [God-
dard and Akiyama 1989: 148; Sellen and God-
dard 1997: 134]. In the last fifteen years there
has been a tendency in the main importing
countries to substitute Colombian Milds for the
lower priced Other Milds. The very popular
Red Brand (Roodmerk) coffee of Sara Lee/
Douwe Egberts with more than 40% of the
total market in the Netherlands, uses in its
blends from one third till half part of Robusta,
Unwashed Arabica or low quality Other Milds
in its blends [Hooghiemstra 1991: 16; Pelu-
pessy and Van Tilburg 1994: 245]. Differen-
tiation gives the Silver (about half Arabica)
and Gold Brand (100% Arabica) with higher
prices and much smaller market shares.
Other entry barriers are the transformation
efficiency and roasting technology, high ad-
vertising and other sunk costs (5-10% of
gross income), brand loyalty of customers,
etc.5 To control the chain lead firms need to
invest high amounts of so-called sunk costs in
infrastructure, equipment, brand introduction
4. International Coffee Organization, 21-8-2004: “Price-
elasticity of demand and coffee consumption in impor-
ting countries,” p. 8.
5. 10 till 20% of the weight are lost in the transformation
of green to roasted coffee beans. Efficient large-scale
roasters operate near the minimum percentage, while
small ones approximate the maximum limit.
. . .
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and other fixed marketing costs. A recent fa-
vourable technological innovation for large
roasters’ blends is the possibility to eliminate
some “bitterness” from the taste of Robusta
and other low quality coffees. This may re-
duce the costs of a mélange. Another is the
development of consumers’ preparation ma-
chines, which allow a better appreciation of
the taste, aroma and freshness, like espresso
machines, senseo, coffee pads, etc. [Muradian
and Pelupessy 2005].
Mélanges are used by big and small roas-
ters and traders to provide both high and low
qualities coffees. Nevertheless, the high
concentration ratios of roasters and retailers
are also important to explain the blending prac-
tices, which are instrumental to diversify sup-
pliers and reduce costs and risks. In most
importing countries, a few roasters control a
very large part of the market with a fringe of
smaller firms for the rest. For example, in the
Netherlands Sara Lee/Douwe Egberts has a
market share of about 70%, Albert Heijn (Mar-
velo) has another 12% and the rest of the
market is divided among some 20 smaller roas-
ters. The largest four have a combined share
of more than 90% in this country. Four large
multinational companies provide more than
60% of all coffee in the 25 main consuming
countries: Nestlé, Jacobs/Kraft General Foods,
Sara Lee/Douwe Egberts and Procter &
Gamble [Talbot 2004: 103-104]. These firms
together with Starbucks, control 75-80% of the
US market.6
Let’s give a more detailed picture of the
market power of the earlier mentioned multi-
national companies in the roasted and ground
coffee markets of 12 countries, representing
65% of world consumption in 2004-2005. The
small roasters participations are at a great dis-
tance from the leaders. The multinationals are
also market leaders in several countries. So
Nestlé leads in United Kingdom, Japan, Aus-
tralia, Portugal and China. Kraft Foods is
number one in the United States, France,
Sweden and Canada. Sara Lee leads in the Ne-
therlands, Belgium and Brazil. Tchibo has a
first place in Germany, Austria and the Eastern
European countries Poland, Czech Republic
and Hungary [Daviron and Ponte 2005].7 On
the demand side, there are the individual
consumers, who are numerous with insignifi-
cant market shares and low (negative) price
elasticities of demand because coffee is subject
to habit formation.
The second differentiation wave has to do
with the sustainability of the production pro-
cess of coffee, which is an extrinsic or cre-
dence attribute of the product. In 2003 this
included an estimated 1% of the worldwide
exports. Ranked by quantities, the most impor-
tant sustainable coffees had Organic, Fair
Trade, Utz Kapeh, Rainforest Alliance and
shade-grown certifications [Daviron and Ponte
2005: 167], sold under a diversity of brands.
An organic production technology pretends to
maintain a sustainable agro-eco-system.
Shade-grown coffee is supposed to preserve
6. UNCTAD, The coffee guide 2007: “The mainstream
markets for coffee”, p. 6.
7. See also UNCTAD, The coffee guide 2007: “Niche
markets, environment and social aspects,” “World coffee
trade,” “Futures markets,” “Quality control issues,” “The




biodiversity and birds’ habitat, while fair trade
guarantees a fixed buying price for the coffee.
Utz Kapeh and Rainforest Alliance are mix-
tures of the earlier mentioned certifications
with weaker conditions, aiming at acceptance
by the mainstream blends.
In the following years all certificated sus-
tainable coffees increased strongly. For 2005
the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
estimated that organic coffee exports grew to
about 0.9%8 of total exports, which was almost
the share of all sustainable categories together
two years ago. Since almost 70% of all organic
coffee exports were exported to the United
States, Germany and Japan, market shares will
be considerably higher for these countries. In
the same year Fair Trade coffee reached 0.7%
of total exports, which were for 60% concen-
trated to the United States, France and the
United Kingdom.9 Utz Kapeh showed a per-
centage of 0.9%, which makes 2.6% of world
exports for the three certifications together.
The volumes of certificated sustainability
coffees are still minor parts of the global
consumption, despite their high growth rates as
is shown for 2005. In absolute quantities most
organic and Fair Trade coffees are consumed
in the United States, but the percentages are
small because of the extension of this market.
These two certifications together vary from
1.7% for the Japanese (only Organic) to 4.2%
for the United Kingdom market.10 The figures
are still incomplete and Utz Kapeh certifica-
tions are significant and also increasing. No
reliable information was available on Rain Fo-
rest Alliance and shade-grown coffees, which
consumption could be similar to the Utz Kapeh
figures. The sustainability differentiation is
considered as part of the specialty coffee seg-
ments, which cover 10% of the market. Origi-
nally this term was used in the United States
for products sold in special coffee shops.
Today it is a catchword for single origin, sus-
tainable and unconventional (flavoured) cof-
fees, high quality blends.11 Commercially the
specialty segment includes single origin high
intrinsic value coffees for niche markets as Ja-
maican Blue Mountain, Indonesian Luwak,
premium brands of superior quality organic
coffee and natural Robustas, and mainstream
average quality. Small specialized roasters and
traders introduced the sustainability categories
and are active in niche markets [Daviron and
Ponte 2005]. The big companies dominate the
premium brands and mainstream qualities of
speciality coffees.
PRICES
In the differentiated coffee markets consumers
pay price premiums for both intrinsic (sensorial)
and extrinsic (non-sensorial) product attributes.
Retail prices of mainly standard blends are
very different among importing non-producing
8. UNCTAD estimations gave organic consumption as
1% of the world total.
9. UNCTAD, The coffee guide 2007: “Niche markets,
environment and social aspects,” pp. 12, 24.
10. International Coffee Organization, 19-4-2006: “Ef-
fects of tariffs on the coffee trade,” and 25-9-2006:
“Overview of the coffee market.”
11. UNCTAD, The coffee guide 2007: “Niche markets,
environment and social aspects,” “World coffee trade,”
“Futures markets,” “Quality control issues,” “The main-
stream markets for coffee.”
. . .
193
The world behind the world coffee market
countries. In a period of fifteen years (1990-
2005) Japan had always the highest prices, Italy
was second and Germany third. In 1990 the
United States had the lowest average prices,
which could be a consequence of the standard
(low) quality blends consumption, without
many differentiations at that time. In the 2000s
this changed, as the cheapest roasted coffee
blends were then sold in France and in Sweden
at prices also below those of the US. It is dif-
ficult to find an explanation for the differences
and one may consider in the first place the prices
and qualities of the imported green coffee va-
rieties. In the beginning of the 1990s Germany’s
import package was for 70% composed by the
expensive Colombian Milds and Other Milds.12
However, the participation of these two varie-
ties was considerably less in the imports of
Japan and Italy, which showed the highest re-
tail prices of that time. The United States had
the highest share of Other Milds and together
with Colombian Milds this reached a signifi-
cant 60% of their imports. In the 2000s strong
reductions of the import of Colombian Milds
took place in Germany with one of the higher
roasted coffee price levels, as well as in the
Netherlands and Sweden with moderate consu-
mers’ prices. The latter strongly increased the
imports of expensive Other Milds. Neverthe-
less, consumers’ prices of Sweden showed a
declining trend to become one of the lowest in
2005, despite their relatively expensive coffee
beans imports.
All the importing countries showed a similar
trend in their retail prices: a strong increase in
the beginning 1990s and afterwards a decrease
with for some countries a partial recovery in
2005. For others there was a continuous decline
since 1995, while Italy was the only country
that ended in 2005 with higher prices than in
1995. The breakthrough of speciality coffees
may have increased the US price. Blending
practices make it difficult to relate consumers’
prices directly to those of the world market.
Premiums for extrinsic characteristics of the se-
cond wave of differentiation may give addi-
tional price variations. However, their impact
could not be traced because of the reduced
shares of certified coffees. Only Japan and Ger-
many showed in 2005 high average retail prices,
while the US, France and the UK belong to the
group with the lower prices.
The market structures in Europe were cha-
racterized by oligopolistic interdependency [Bet-
tendorf and Verboven 2000; Feuerstein 2001].
Prices for roasted coffee rose less than propor-
tional with green coffee bean prices, because
only part of the marginal costs was accounted
for by green coffee, and a (small) reduction in
mark-up took place. The concentration of market
power by one or some roasters, does not exclude
competitive behavior by others.
A notable feature is the combination of pro-
duct differentiation and brand loyalty for the
position of retailers in consumer markets. Pro-
duct differentiation based on blends is gaining
importance with the strong increase of so-
called gourmet and special coffees, which in
value have already captured 30% of the US
market. In importing countries the demand is
strongly increasing for these higher quality and
12. International Coffee Organization, 21-8-2004: “Price-





other differentiated coffees [Fitter and Ka-
plinsky 2001]. Competition among roasters
often takes place with non-price instruments
as blends, advertising and bonus systems to
maintain brand loyalty, rather than with prices.
As we have stated before, the geographic
origin plays a role in the differentiation of va-
riety and quality.
Supermarkets and other retailers distribute
70% of the coffee to final consumers.13 The
other 30% is consumed in restaurants, hotels,
bars, institutions (work) and specialty shops as
Starbucks and the Coffee Factory. The trend
towards high concentration in the roasting
stage can also be observed in retailing, where
in most European countries the largest five su-
permarket chains have a joint market share of
over 50%. Their weight vis-à-vis the roasters
is considerable and increasing. Some retailers
also engage in backward integration with roas-
ting and own brands as the case of the super-
market chain Albert Heijn and roaster Marvelo
in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the roasters
are still powerful because of the definition of
the brands by the specific blends.
One of the few studies on the coffee pricing
strategies of retailers is done for the US by
P. Nelson and his colleagues [1992] assuming
there is monopolistic competition in the roas-
ting industry with differentiation of products
supported by brand advertising. The study
found that prices are influenced by the relative
market share of the brand (+), times when and
places where competition is unusually strong
(–), advertising per unit of sales of competitors
(–) and the prices of green coffee beans (+).
Price is reduced and ads increased when
competition becomes stronger.
An explanation for the positive observed re-
lationship between market share and price could
not be explained by consumers’ taste prefe-
rences for the brand and ad-hoc evidence sug-
gests that retailers cut their margins when
wholesale prices are increasing. The special
preferences are therefore more likely to have
originated from the retailers than from the final
consumers. It is possible that the retailers use
the roaster’s brand as a special offer, because it
induces extra-sales of other products. This retail
strategy may be worthwhile when there is a
large market share. Most other research consi-
ders the retail trade only as intermediary that
buys roasted coffee to sell it with a margin to
consumers, without particular own preferences.
Concluding, we may say that in the main
importing countries it will be practically im-
possible to increase the per capita consump-
tion of coffee significantly due to market
saturation and other factors. In these markets
there may still be opportunities to augment
the number of coffee drinkers. Emerging and
underdeveloped markets with less than 2 cups
per head a day, may offer more opportunities.
However, in most developing countries coffee
consumption is stagnating, with the exception
of the largest domestic consumption market
of Brazil and the much smaller one of Costa
Rica.
The preservation and expansion of market
shares are therefore of utmost importance for
roasters and retailers. Despite their high and
stable concentration, both price competition
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and markups are moderate. Large roasters and
supermarket chains are also entangled in a
strong competition struggle, as in most of the
food industry. Non-price competition is more
important, because quality enhancement, pro-
duct differentiation and innovation are the
main trends. These trends are only partially
visible in the big differences among countries
in the varieties of imported green coffee. Most
of the upgrading for the consumer is done by
blending, roasting intensity, packaging and
branding in the consuming countries, which
have affected retail coffee prices.
Traditionally, all this had been related to
the intrinsic product attributes. Since the 1980s
the attention for extrinsic qualities as environ-
mental and social friendliness, has accelerated
the differentiation of consumers’ markets. Ad-
vertising and large retailers strategies play cru-
cial roles in this process. Large roasters could
maintain positions by their blendings and cor-
responding brands, while smaller ones could
do so by specialization for niche markets. The
assumptions of coffee as a homogenous
commodity and the independence of the out-
comes of vertically related markets in the
chains must be reconsidered.
International markets
SPOT MARKETS
Because production takes place for almost
100% in 57 tropical developing countries and
consumption for some 75% in 43 developed
ones, international trade is an essential linkage
of the coffee chain. Here green coffee is mostly
traded and therefore the minor international
flows of decaffeinated, roasted and ground, or
instant coffees will only indirectly be treated
in this article, as trade statistics are registered
in green coffee equivalents.
The major country importers of coffee are
the United States, Germany, Japan and
France with shares of 25, 19, 8 and 6% res-
pectively.14 Major exporters are Brazil (29%),
Vietnam (15%), Colombia (11%) and Indo-
nesia (7%). This implies the presence of
concentration ratios (biggest four) of 0.58 for
both importing and producing countries. But
if we put the two trading blocs EU (25) and
US together, they will count for almost three
quarters of all coffee imports. Mention should
also be made of re-exports by importing coun-
tries, which have been increasing conti-
nuously from about 19% of the total exports
in 1999 to 30% in 2005. Countries like Ger-
many and the US rank fourth and seventh as
exporters. A considerable part of their exports
are processed coffees. For 2004 and 2005 al-
most all (93%) of the re-exports from the EU
(25) to non-EU destinations were decaffei-
nated, roasted and soluble coffees.15 This has
increased the value added share of re-exports
compared to exports. The average prices of
the coffee re-exports from the EU (25) to
non-EU destinations were 3.39 and 4.32
euro/kg for respectively 2004 and 2005.
14. Imports and exports (bags) as an average percentage
of world imports and exports in 2004 and 2005 of res-
pectively ICO importing and exporting members, see
www.ico.org.
15. See European Coffee Federation 2006: “European





The prices were for the incoming coffees res-
pectively 1.11 and 1.55 euro/kg for the same
years.16
Market studies gave low-income elastici-
ties of demand for high per capita consuming
regions and relatively high values (> 1) for
low consumption economies, while price elas-
ticities of demand have low (negative) values
for all. International prices are also sensitive
to changes of Brazil’s coffee production,
which were often related to weather condi-
tions. However, the declining share of
Brazil’s coffee and the changes of the location
of its cultivation have reduced these sources
of volatility. L.S. Karp and J.M. Perloff
[1993] demonstrated that even Brazil and Co-
lombia together could only exert a limited de-
gree of international market power. Large
inventories in consumers and producers coun-
tries may also reduce the impact of big pro-
duction fluctuations. The differences between
the available exportable coffee and consump-
tion as indicators of the oversupply gap in the
world markets have declined in recent years.
To estimate available supply, 50% of the
coffee stocks in producing countries were dis-
counted as not immediately tradable and
4 million bags from the inventories of impor-
ting countries as iron ratios [Gilbert and Zant
2001]. With the reduction of global over-
supply the ICO price indicator has been in-
creasing in the 2000s.
In real life the international coffee trade is
conducted by a variety of private agents: dea-
lers, brokers, specialized traders/exporters,
and importers, large importing roasters and
retailers of consuming countries. A striking
feature of the international spot trade of coffee
is the concentration in the market. Only 7 tra-
ding companies handled 56% of the global
imports in 1993 [Wheeler 1995]. More recent
data show 41.5% as the total share of the big
five: Rothfos, E.D. & F. Man, Volcafé, Car-
gill and Aron, while the top ten reaches 62.2%
[Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001]. Volcafé bought
E.D. & F. Man and Cargill merged with Es-
teve in the 2000s. Earlier Rothfos was taken
over by Neumann which made the two largest
traders Neumann and Volcafé sharing 20% of
the market and the top six with 50%, while
later on the biggest three controlled 45% of
the market [Daviron and Ponte 2005: 91, 93].
As mentioned before, with the second diffe-
rentiation wave, small traders and roasters
emerged in the specialty segment trade.
J. Morisset [1998] is one of the few studies
that deal explicitly with the role of the large
trading houses on spot markets. He found that
the sources of the observed widening of the
spread between international market and
consumer prices over a twenty-five years pe-
riod were likely to be commodity-specific. For
many commodities as coffee, 6 or fewer
companies control about 70% of the interna-
tional trade. These firms could hardly be only
price takers in the market. However, the mul-
tinational concentration in the downstream
buyers market of big roasters and retailers be-
came even stronger. This made the interna-
tional trading houses loosing ground after the
1980s; while the smaller and less specialized
ones were shaken out.
16. See European Coffee Federation 2006: “European
Coffee Report,” pp. 7,9.
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FUTURES MARKETS
The futures market is in the first place a fi-
nancial market, in the sense that contracts are
nearly always canceled by an opposite trans-
action at the end of its duration. They are used
for risk reduction and speculation and may
also attract parties not involved in the coffee
business. In the London International Finan-
cial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE)
the volume traded was approximately five
times global Robusta coffee production in
1997, while in the New York Board of Trade
(NYBOT) this volume was over nine times the
world exports of all types of coffee. There was
an explosive increase of hedging and specu-
lation over time in both New York and
London. From the beginning 1990s to 2006
the futures and options volume turnovers in-
creased from 11 to 19 times that of gross
world imports of coffee.17
This indicates that a considerable amount
of speculation is present in these markets. Fu-
tures markets integrate into their prices all
available information on (expected) supply and
demand and through arbitrage they may in-
fluence the prevailing spot prices. The in-
fluence of futures on spot markets makes it
difficult to explain international coffee price
fluctuations. Theoretically futures prices
should approximate spot prices in the long run
as contracts reach maturity and may provide
some useful signals to facilitate decision-ma-
king with respect to production, sale, purchase
and storage. If futures prices are unbiased es-
timators of spot prices in the future, futures
markets may be used by developing countries
for dealing with price risks.
C.L. Gilbert and C. Brunetti [1997] show
among others that the international price move-
ments in 1993 were mainly due to the mere
announcement of the coffee retention scheme
of the Association of Coffee Producing Coun-
tries. The retention itself had fewer effects on
futures prices, which could indicate the impor-
tance of expectations. In 1994 investors and
speculators from outside the coffee business,
who diverted investment away from bonds and
equity into commodities, caused price upheaval.
The portfolio diversification away from equity
and bonds into coffee was a very small amount
in relation to the overall bond and equity ope-
rations, but nevertheless it was a very signifi-
cant sum of money for the coffee market.
Because their profits were high due to the unex-
pected frost in Brazil, coffee became a popular
investment for a while, which was visible in the
interest that speculators took again in coffee in
1995. The only difference was that the specu-
lators now came less from outside, but more
from commodity investment funds.
Although single actors cannot influence
market outcomes, it is possible that a group of
speculators with coordination can bid up
prices, or when closing their positions all at
the same time, make the prices drop. This
seems negative, but on the other hand, their
actions can also work in favour of coffee gro-
wers. In fact, it is necessary on futures markets
that there are parties who take opposite posi-
tions, because otherwise no contracts can be
17. UNCTAD, The coffee guide 2007: “Quality control





concluded. Their functioning thus fits in the
wider discussion on the positive or negative
role that speculation plays in markets. Surely
futures markets may be strongly and erratically
affected by expectations and it is not clear if
parties concerned could affect them conti-
nuously in a systematic way.
An interesting case was when at the end of
the 1970s, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and some
Central American countries, could success-
fully raise their quotations on the futures
market through a joint private company Pan-
café [Pelupessy 1993: 45]. It functioned as an
ordinary dealer, only bigger and over a longer
period. Losses occurred because the accumu-
lation of stocks was not followed by shortages
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion in the US changed their rules of the game.
Brazil closed the initiative in exchange for the
willingness of large importing countries to ne-
gotiate the fourth International Coffee Agree-
ment. Another study showed how Côte
d’Ivoire could stabilize export incomes by fu-
tures market operations [ibid.].
Finalizing this section on the international
markets, it is clear that they are also very
concentrated. However, the big international
trading houses have lost ground to roasters and
retailers, who dominate the governance struc-
ture of the coffee chains. Their relationship
with international traders tends to be that of
unstable bilateral oligopolies. The impact of
futures markets on spot prices makes things
more complicated, as (financial) speculators
from other sectors have strongly increased par-
ticipation. This makes market fundamentals
less relevant for determination of spot prices.
Country behaviour based calculi were and are
not adequate to reach international market ba-
lances, since only private companies can be
chain actors and market parties.
Producers’ markets
The coffee demanded by final consumers in
developed countries and traded and processed
in the different stages of the chain, will be sup-
plied by millions of smallholders operating on
local markets in tropical countries. Buyers on
these markets are a much smaller number of
middlemen or intermediaries and processors.
COFFEE GROWERS
Usually coffee growers possess small plots, va-
rying from on average 0.5 hectare coffee in
Ethiopia and Tanzania to 1.16 hectare in India
and more than 5 hectares in Nicaragua. Large
estates are scarce since internal economies of
scale are limited and land tenancy is traditio-
nally fragmented for this crop. Normally, only
a minor part of the production is harvested on
properties of more than 10 hectares.
The grower’s income and production capa-
city are the two key issues, which are normally
raised in the assessment of this end of the
chain. They may provide arguments for public,
NGO and other interventions in domestic mar-
kets. Coffee shrubs become productive only
after three to five years; response to price mo-
vements is therefore slow and price supply
elasticities are low. Most supply reactions are
considerably less than proportional and in the
first year not higher than 0.2, because in the
short run only the intensification of plot main-
tenance and harvesting could raise production
[Akiyama and Duncan 1981; Pollard and
. . .
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Graham 1992; Pelupessy 1993; Branchi et al.
1999]. For periods up to eight years the
maximum estimated elasticity is 0.6.18 In the
long run the value of the elasticities may
increase, such as in Vietnam, Brazil and
Colombia, where apparently there were possi-
bilities to enlarge the agrarian frontier or to
substitute other crops. The lack of smallhol-
ders’ access to inputs and external services
may also cause low elasticities. Credits are res-
tricted for small export commodity growers in
liberalized countries.
Middlemen frequently operate between far-
mers and processing plants or exporters, as in
India and the “sabsabies” in Ethiopia. Their
role is often subject to much debate: do they
abuse market power as is assumed by follo-
wers of the different Fair Trade campaigns, or
is their behaviour competitive, especially if the
risk and transactions costs are calculated of the
services they provide to smallholders? These
include the first collection of the harvested ber-
ries, credit, transport and storage. Intervention
by government agencies or parastatal monopo-
lies as in Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda (until 1990)
and Vietnam had not always been favourable
to growers.
Because of scale advantages, first proces-
sing and hulling mills are far more concen-
trated, which strengthens their market position.
Therefore, minimum producer prices esta-
blished by marketing boards or other institu-
tions could be advantageous to small and less
efficient growers. The growers often bear the
risk of fluctuating world market prices. In a
very productive country such as Costa Rica
the impact of price fluctuations may have
enhanced efficiency, probably due to small-
holders’ good access to inputs, credit and ser-
vices [Cardenas 1994]. Other important rea-
sons are the cultivation on high altitudes and
adequate first processing facilities, which re-
sults in very good quality Other Milds coffee
for this country.
In general, the market structures for berries
seems to be oligopsonistic. For each interme-
diary there could be from 20 (Haiti) to 250 or
more growers (Côte d’Ivoire), while the more
concentrated mills may serve from 100 in
Brazil to 18.000 growers each, as in Côte
d’Ivoire. This means that growers are gene-
rally price takers with a productive behaviour
of either adaptive expectations19 or rational ex-
pectations.20 However, only about a third of
the variability in agricultural investment beha-
viour could be related to market price move-
ments [Branchi et al. 1999].
Foreign buyers with access to international
finance become very powerful when local
credit institutions are lacking or inefficient. An
example is given by the emergence of verti-
cally integrated exporters in Tanzania as sub-
sidiaries of multinational companies, which
became the owners of all private processing
mills in the country [Temu et al. 2001]. But
also in this case a sufficient number of compe-
titors and institutional improvements may res-
trict oligopsonistic behaviour. The creation of
18. After full adaptation in the long run, elasticities
might be much higher (2-3) when new land is available.
19. See case studies of Costa Rica, Mexico and El Sal-
vador in F. Jaramillo and T. Akiyama [1990].





producers’ cooperatives, increasing competi-
tion by domestic buyers, falling supply and
large-scale smuggling, as in Ethiopia, Uganda,
and Bolivia, may also strengthen the market
position of growers. Governments can also af-
fect the outcomes by providing processing fa-
cilities, setting minimum producer prices, or
applying other rules.
The liberalization of the market for coffee
berries and elimination of the government mar-
keting boards may have resulted in higher
prices for growers and capacity enhancing be-
haviour. However, lack of access to inputs and
price uncertainty require institutional improve-
ments to foster investment and a competitive
market structure [Akiyama 2001; Temu et al.
2001]. These improvements accounted for two
thirds of the explanation of growers’ beha-
viour. Since institutional change needs time,
the higher long run price elasticities become
relevant and in this way persisting price de-
creases may have enduring negative effects on
production capacity.
Considering the growers’ income by pound
of coffee for five important growers’ countries
(Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Indonesia,
Vietnam) representing 60% of world produc-
tion, it is interesting to note that these incomes
are more coffee variety rather than country-
specific.21 Internationally Robusta cultivators
get significantly less income per pound than
Arabica. The figures for Brazil and Indonesia
are eloquent and clearly differ according to va-
riety. World market prices play an important
role and possibly cultivators income is what is
left after deductions of fixed processing, trans-
port and trade margins. In the 2000s Robus-
ta growers’ income per pound increased
continuously, while Arabica dropped in the
first one or two years, to assume increases
later. These differences also appear for the two
varieties within the same country, while gene-
rally the Robusta-Arabica growers’ income
gap tends to reduce in time.
PROCESSING
A second segment of the domestic coffee chain
in producing countries is that of processed or
green coffee production, which may be sold by
the mills to either exporters or domestic roas-
ters. The coffee can be processed in both dry
and wet ways. In the dry system the first drying
is done by the grower, to be delivered or stored
as parchment coffee until the time is suitable
to sell. This occurs frequently for the Robusta
variety in for example Uganda, Vietnam and
India. A great deal of Arabica in Ethiopia and
Nicaragua is still processed by the dry method,
which is simple and cheap when sun drying is
used. In Brazil most of the (natural) Arabica
is also sun-dried. Under the wet method as ap-
plied in for instance Central America, farmers
deliver the fresh berries to a processing plant
within twenty-four hours of picking, which re-
duces their market power. The berries are then
transformed; first into parchment and later into
exportable green coffee. In Colombia decen-
tralized wet processing is in most cases inte-
grated on the farm. Wet processing is more
capital-intensive than the dry one, but if cen-
tralized it is also much more controllable and
21. See International Coffee Organization, 16-5-2005:
“Overview of the coffee market;” 12-9-2005: “Obstacles
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often applied to obtain homogenous high qua-
lity Arabica. Washed Arabica could receive
considerable premiums, as in Ethiopia, where
it varies between 20 and 100%. However, there
is a trade-off between this kind of quality in-
creasing modernization and the environmen-
tally friendlier dry method production, which
can also be rewarding if sold as certified Or-
ganic coffee.
Little is known about the marketing struc-
tures between mills and exporters or roasters
in coffee growing countries. Processors and
exporters could also be vertically integrated as
in Haiti, the vertically integrated (multina-
tional) exporters in Tanzania and the coopera-
tive mills in Costa Rica. Other exporters may
be domestic private companies or subsidiaries
of foreign traders or governments agencies. In
India and Tanzania auctions are playing an im-
portant efficiency-enhancing role as market
mechanisms for exports [Akiyama 2001; Temu
et al. 2001]. These countries and others like
Uganda and Togo have shown a decreasing
spread between growers and export prices, as
a consequence of liberalization and improved
access of new actors to the local green coffee
market. Export taxing had mostly been discon-
tinued because of outward oriented strategies
and the international coffee crisis of the 1990s.
DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION
Domestic consumer markets of coffee growing
countries include about a quarter of world
consumption, but represent the better opportu-
nities for growth in the near future. Processors
usually sell lower quality green coffee to local
roasters who generally manufacture single
variety ground coffee using outdated techno-
logy of a dull and uneven roasting. Green
coffee traded for domestic consumption may
vary from between 25 and 50% of the harvest
in Ethiopia and other local market oriented
producers as Sri Lanka, India and Bolivia. It
is 10% or less for the other typical export-
oriented countries, with the exception of Brazil
where about 30% of the production has a do-
mestic destination. Consumption per capita is
still low in most producing countries, varying
between 2.6 kilograms in Nicaragua and
1.5 kilogram annually in Ethiopia to 0.07 kilo-
gram in Tanzania. This is considerably below
the levels in developed countries, which may
reach 8 kilograms per capita or more.22
Today, in most cases the domestic trade for
consumption has been liberalized, but this has
not dynamized local demand, despite the
growth potential of underdeveloped markets.
Low income per capita in the first place, tea-
drinking habits and capacity shortage of roas-
ting factories have negative effects. An
interesting development has taken place in
Costa Rica where falling world market prices
at the end of the 1980s and the booming tourist
sector have created higher domestic demand
(4.34 kg/cap) and higher local prices for qua-
lity coffee. It is to be expected that high quality
and product differentiation preferences from
developed consumer markets will blow over to
upper class markets in producing countries.
Brazil with 5.01 kilograms/capita domestic
22. Foreign Agricultural Service/United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, circular series 2004 and 2006: “Tro-





consumption is increasing above the stagnated
EU (25) average.
Policies such as forced delivery to the local
market, retail price control and consumption
taxes sometimes have negative effects on in-
ternal prices for roasted coffee. For smallhol-
ders, domestic consumption with lower
quantity and quality requirements may offer
interesting alternatives to exports. Price elas-
ticities of demand (negative) are estimated as
0.30 for Brazil and 0.379 for Haiti, while the
latter showed an income elasticity (positive) of
0.804.23 Concentration of private exporters,
state agencies, processing mills and domestic
roasters may create bilateral oligopolies and
collusive actions in this market segment of pro-
ducing countries, but the potential entry of
newcomers stimulated by liberalization, may
restrict the full and continuous excise of
market power.
Concluding this section it is clear that at the
supply side of the markets for coffee berries
there are numerous smallholders with little or
no market power. Supply elasticities are small
in the short run because of the specific nature
and technology of the product, difficult access
to inputs and credit and scarcity of available
land. Middlemen, traders and processing mills
are more concentrated, making it a buyers
market, sometimes an unstable oligopsony.
The elimination of state intervention in berries
and green coffee markets may have delivered
better prices to growers in some cases, but has
never automatically improved the institutions
needed for sustainability. An international
comparison of growers’ income in the 2000s
indicates that differences are variety and less
country-specific. Robusta income per pound
has been growing continuously, while Arabica
is still on top, but differences are decreasing.
The domestic chain segments after processing
are either vertically integrated or of a bilateral
oligopoly nature. Consumer markets in produ-
cing countries are still underdeveloped in
terms of quantity and quality, and are only for
Brazil and Costa Rica in the emerging growth
stage. Nevertheless, more attention should be
paid to developing markets as they have the
real potential to grow in the medium term and
to become a feasible destination for small-
holder production.
Governance and coordinations
From the assessment of the markets sequence
one may infer that the coffee chain could not
be seen as a randomly evolved network of bu-
sinesses working with coffee. There are key ac-
tors or leading forces who control and organize
the strategic parts of the chain. This is done for
rent creation and appropriation, with price and
non-pricing behaviour based on market power
and coordination. Therefore we could not en-
dorse the opinion of R. Fitter and R. Kaplinsky
[2001: 78] that governance is “largely absent”
in coffee chains. Coordination may be executed
in a direct or indirect way. This would not be
possible if all coffee transactions take place in
perfectly competitive markets, but this is defi-
nitely not the case. Coffee markets are highly
organized from within and outside the chain by
private and public parties.
23. We may observe that Brazil and France have the
same consumption per head of 5.01 kilograms yearly and
the same negative demand elasticity of 0.30 as well.
. . .
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PRIVATE
Leading actors have established rules to standar-
dize and normalize market transactions and also
applied coordination in different chain segments.
These are accepted by and legitimate for all chain
actors and other parties involved. Grading and
classification is based on botanical variety, alti-
tude or region, processing (wet or dry), bean size
and shape and colour, number of defects, roast
appearance, cup quality and density of the beans.24
This has led to the general acceptance of four
commercial varieties (Colombian Milds, Other
Milds, Natural Brazilian, Robusta) and nume-
rous subvarieties. International markets use the
ICO indicator price based on weights for Co-
lombian Milds 13%, Other Milds 27%, Brazi-
lian 25%, Robustas 35%.25
The number of bean defects which could be
caused by cultivation, harvest or first processing
practices, determines the green coffee grading
[Boot 2002: 98-104]. Cup-value is based on fra-
grance and aroma, acidity, flavour, body, after-
taste and the adjustment to increase or decrease
the aggregated five factors. The specialty or
gourmet coffee that appeared in the 1980s in the
United States uses thresholds for the same cri-
teria: coffee beans should not contain any flavour
defect, minimal visible defects and cup-value of
at least 80% of the maximum [ibid.: 22].
Health concerns of consumers have increased
the scope of control in developed countries, in-
cluding the detection of the coffee mould ochra-
toxin A, pesticide residues and hydrocarbon
contamination by jute bags. The rules, practices,
conditions and terminology of the international
coffee trade have been standardized by the Eu-
ropean Coffee Federation (ECF) and the Green
Coffee Association of New York (GCA). The
60 kg bag is used as unit of measurement, US $
price quotations by pound, minimal traded quan-
tity of 1 container (18 MT), green bean equiva-
lents, etc. Most of these rules were introduced
and applied long before the establishment of the
liberalization strategies of the 1980s.
The governance structure by a small number
of big corporations preceded these and was not
a consequence of the liberalization strategies as
suggested by J.M. Talbot [2004] and by B. Da-
viron and S. Ponte [2005]. Governments and
ICO interventions could have affected the in-
come distribution in the coffee chain, but had
never controlled its (private) governance. The
asymmetric income distribution in the chain to
be discussed later in this section did also pre-
cede liberalization. What did come with libera-
lization was the second differentiation wave
with the proliferation of sustainable coffee cer-
tifications and corresponding private coordina-
tions [Muradian and Pelupessy 2005]. It should
also be remembered that only value generators
could become lead firms in the chain.
PUBLIC
The public coordinations or interventions that
come from outside the coffee chain are impor-
tant. They can take place on all levels and may
have considerable effects on both performance
and outcome of the markets. A first intervention
category to consider is taxes and tariffs in
24. UNCTAD, The coffee guide 2007: “World coffee
trade,” p. 3.





consuming countries, which are often neglected
in policy discussions. This may be unjustified,
given the extensive and variable appropriation of
rents from the coffee chain by the importing
countries’ governments. Coffee exporting coun-
tries of the Association of Coffee Producing
Group (former French and British colonies in
Africa and the Caribbean) and the Andean
Community exporting to the EU are favoured by
bilateral elimination of import duties. Andean
countries have also privileged trade relations
with the US (except Bolivia and Venezuela). For
processed coffees, Brazil is charged by the EU
7.5% for roasted and 9% for decaffeinated and
instant coffees. Others as Vietnam, Indonesia and
India have to pay from 2.6 to 3.1%. Mexico en-
joys special advantages from the US and Canada
within the NAFTA framework.
VAT rates of green coffee in some European
countries are much higher than the (former) export
tax rates in most producing ones. Examples are
Denmark (25%), Norway (23%), Poland (22%),
Austria (20%), Italy (20%), Slovakia (19%), and
Sweden (25% for out of home consumption). As a
comparison, export taxes of producing countries
were never more than 5% of the consumers price.
There may also be additional rates on roasted
coffee. Germany raises actually a VAT rate of 7%
with an excise tax of 2.19 euro/kg on roasted
coffee and 4.70 euro/kg on extracts. Some green
coffee imports to the EU are still charged with the
common external tariff of 4%. Exchange rate mar-
kets and policies may have indirect influence on
the coffee sector, because international trade in
coffee is usually paid in US $.
VAT and tax rates in general have no strong
effects on coffee consumption, given the low
price elasticities. In exporting countries there
are tariff and non-tariff measures to protect the
local coffee industry. Examples are Brazil and
Colombia with import duties on processed cof-
fees and Vietnam with 20% on green and 50%
on roasted coffee.26 This may hamper further
growth or the development of blends to raise
quality in the domestic markets.
Collusion in international spot markets may
represent a second category of intervention by
states, producers associations and others. The two
most important interventions of the past in this
sense were those of the International Coffee
Agreement (which included both consuming and
producing countries) and the Association of
Coffee Producing Countries. The first broke
down in 1989 because of the persistent tendency
of overproduction, the problems of new quota
definitions and free rider behaviour of members.
The second was unsuccessful to reach clear
agreements and monitoring mechanisms. Collu-
sion among a (limited) number of countries might
give other opportunities to increase the income of
producing countries through market outcome.
E. Giraud-Heraud and his colleagues [1995]
have investigated (game-theoretically) what the
consequences are of product differentiation in
high and low quality coffees for the possibilities
of collusive behaviour in the world market. It
is assumed that countries collude by setting quan-
tities (Cournot game). A first result was that high
levels of product differentiation induce high in-
centives to cheat on the collusion scheme for all,
regardless of whether they produce the high or
26. International Coffee Organization, 12-9-2005: “Obs-




The world behind the world coffee market
low quality coffee. A second result was that
larger product differentiation between two
groups of colluding producing countries en-
hances the sustainability of each cartel, when
both can set their own retention share. In contrast,
when all countries with different qualities col-
lude in one cartel with a uniform retention share,
higher product differentiation increases the in-
centive for the high-quality (Arabica) producers
to cheat while reducing this for the low quality
(Robusta) producers. In this case it seems wise to
let the higher quality producers set the retention
share. The implication for the market dynamics
is that the high quality producers (should) have
more power in collusion negotiations. Marketing
and advertising practices increase the degree of
product differentiation of coffee, which therefore
should be taken more into account in interna-
tional coordination schemes.
The conclusions are that rent appropriation by
public intervention is mainly taking place down-
stream of the coffee chain by importing coun-
tries. Final consumption is charged by a number
of taxes and fees. It also seems to be difficult for
producing countries to obtain higher prices for
their coffee by stable collusion in the interna-
tional spot market. Free riders behaviour has
played an important role in the international
coordination efforts in the past and will compli-
cate collusion in the future, given the increasing
differentiation of coffee.
Even large exporting countries as Brazil
and Colombia have only restricted market
power to collude [Karp and Perloff 1993]. It
appeared that the steady-state export prices of
these two big producing countries were bet-
ween 6 and 13% above price taking levels of
the market. Maybe the producing countries are
simply too many, their interests too diverse,
while the entry of new producing countries is
not too difficult and even stimulated by out-
ward oriented development strategies, World
Bank and other international financial institu-
tions loans (Vietnam).
However, international coffee trade is
mostly done by private companies and govern-
ments can at best try to influence their beha-
viour or the market outcome. In an era of
decreasing state intervention, market analysis
should be more concentrated on these compa-
nies instead of states or associations of states.
There may be considerable market power in the
hands of international trading companies, large
roasters and other buyers in consuming coun-
tries, which apply intra-chain coordinations.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The interaction of lead firms behaviour with
private and public coordination efforts from
within and outside the chain results in a certain
income distribution.
The retail prices paid by final consumers give
the total value created in the chain for roasted,
ground and packed coffee in US $/pound. If we
choose Sweden, US, Italy and Spain as important
coffee buyers since 2000 from respectively Co-
lombia, Guatemala, Brazil and Vietnam, we can
notice that consumers’ prices are quite divers, but
in all cases producing countries receive a minor
part of these, which was also the case in earlier
times.27 As a result of increasing export prices,
exporters and cultivators participations have
27. As shown in J.M. Talbot [2004: 166-169] who had




increased in the 2000s. For incomes of both
categories one may clearly distinguish the Ara-
bica Milds participations, from the lower classi-
fied Brazilian and Robusta. In the beginning,
Brazil’s export and growers shares were higher
than of Vietnam, but later the differences disap-
peared and the post-harvest shares reduced for
the two cases. In the two Arabica Milds cases of
Colombia and Guatemala post-harvest partici-
pations increased, as did the growers shares. In
absolute amounts the Colombian and Guate-
malan post-harvest incomes more than doubled
from around 10 to 25 US $/pound. Vietnam
went from 4 to less than 2 US $/pound, while
for Brazil the reduction was from 10 to
7 US $/pound. Government support to growers
could have played a role in the latter two coun-
tries. For all considered cases one could ques-
tion our earlier assumption of fixed rates for
post-harvest activities.
Previous studies have estimated the value dis-
tribution within the chain rather straightforwardly.
It is interesting to note that the income distribution
results of these microstudies are more or less in
line with the previous data. The growers participa-
tion varied between 10-20% of the consumers’
price for roasted and ground coffees as a world
average [Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001: 73], between
7 and 9% for Robusta exported from Uganda and
Tanzania to Italy [Daviron and Ponte 2005:
207-211] and about 14% for Côte d’Ivoire to
France [Pelupessy 1999: 127]. For Arabica it was
almost 15% when exported from Costa Rica to
Germany [ibid.] and 4% from Tanzania to Italy.
Export value participations fluctuated from 9%
for Arabica sold from Tanzania to Italy to 39% for
the world average. All other export participations
were lying between these two percentages.
From the data and discussion in section 1 it
is clear that the leading sectors could be
composed by roasting and retailing companies.
Their value shares varied on average for the roas-
ters between 29 and 72% of the consumers’ price
of the 1990s. The share could increase when we
consider coffee bars and other (out of home) cus-
tomers whose participations are strongly increa-
sing in the main consuming countries.
Preliminary estimates of gross profit rates
along the chain before the crisis of the 1990s and
the analysis of section 1, indicate that roasting and
retailing are the most profitable segments of res-
pectively 33 and 30% of the total profits in the
Costa Rica to Netherlands chain. They have the
highest entry barriers of high concentration ratios,
capital intensity, sunk costs, advertising and pro-
tection rates for processed coffees in importing
countries. In the 1990s smallholders could often
not recover their costs, while downstream big
companies’ profits were still rising considerably.
Big roasting and retailing companies control the
final consumer markets and the supply of the most
value generating differentiated products and
brands. Coffee re-exports from consumers’ coun-
tries and brand alliances with coffee equipment
manufacturers have enhanced this control.28
The stagnation in average consumption in deve-
loped countries could partly be attributed to
“made to measure” coffee equipment.29
28. E.g. Illy-expresso machines in Italy; DE-Philips
Senseo coffeemakers in the Netherlands.
29. Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Develo-
ping Countries, “Coffee, a survey of the Netherlands and
other major markets in the European Union.” Report, Den
Haag, 1997, p. 52.
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Concluding remarks
The sustainability of the linkages between
coffee growing in developing countries and
final consumption in developed ones has been
continuously under pressure. Market demand
of the main consuming countries will not in-
crease substantially and mismatches with chan-
ging consumer preferences may cause
additional problems. In these countries only the
number of coffee drinkers could be increased,
while some opportunities are available in the
emerging markets of Eastern Europe and the
Third World. Easy access to coffee cultivation
and trade has contributed to structural global
oversupply. Coffee chain governance and coor-
dinations gave no durable solutions and could
not prevent asymmetric income distributions.
Consumer markets are highly concentrated,
but price competition seems to be moderate.
Non-price competition is much more important
because consumers do prefer quality, differen-
tiated and new products. Traditionally this had
been achieved with blending practices of mul-
tinational roasters, which today cover 90% of
the market. Quality differentiation was based on
sensorial attributes in the first place, but since
the 1980s extrinsic or non-sensorial ones as sus-
tainability were added. Both kinds of differen-
tiations are mainly realized by downstream
adding value activities near the final consumer,
which increases the market power of big roas-
ting and retailing companies. Big supermarket
chains compete with the roasters, but the latter
could maintain their position by the blends and
corresponding brands. This strengthens their po-
sition in the international markets, despite the
apparent bilateral oligopoly relationship of
producers’ and consumers’ countries. Interna-
tional trading houses also became competitors,
but have lost ground to roasters and retailers.
In this way a few big (multinational) coffee
companies had become the governance force
in most of the global coffee chains and execute
their control by operating in imperfect markets
and coordinating production and trade condi-
tions. International price volatility is not only
caused by spot market imbalances, but also by
the behaviour of speculators and hedgers in the
futures market. Concentration is also present in
the post-harvest stages in producing countries.
However, the oligopsonistic structures are in
this case unstable in the long run because of
potential entry of newcomers, often subsidia-
ries of foreign companies with finance. This is
quite different from the more stable oligopo-
listic structures in consuming countries.
At the supply end of the chain are numerous
smallholders with little or no market power and
difficult access to inputs, with low supply elastici-
ties as a consequence. In a period of increasing
export prices as in the 2000s, depending on the
coffee variety, growers receive between 10 and
25% of the consumer price in the chain. When
prices fall, the share of cultivators will be much
lower. In spite of liberalization, growers suffer the
consequences of fluctuating world market prices
and the asymmetries in power and income distri-
bution of the local buyers’ markets.
Interventions are widely present in the
coffee chain. Lead companies in the first place
and other chain actors, apply coordinations to
get reliable transactions. From outside the
chain there are appropriations of high rents by
importing country governments and entry




Attempts to increase export prices durably by
collusions of exporting and importing coun-
tries or of producer countries only did not suc-
ceed. Because of the increasing product
differentiation there is a tendency to cheating
and overproduction, while even the market
power of big coffee countries is very limited.
Rent seeking behaviour of lead firms in
non-competitive markets has structured the
coffee chain market sequence. Principally big
multinational roasters control the transmission
of material, value and information streams
along the chain at strategic parts. This control
is obtained by market and extra-market coor-
dination tools. High and very divergent final
consumers’ prices are one of the outcomes of
the dynamics of this structure. Growers’ in-
comes at the other extreme of the chains are
much lower and less differentiated when one
considers the geographical and socioeconomic
distances of producing countries. This asym-
metry makes the cultivators segment the wea-
kest link in the chain. If this segment collapses,
the supply of the required category of coffee
could be put at risk, which may affect the sus-
tainability of the whole chain.
A sustainable solution for the imbalances bet-
ween raw material exploitation and final
consumption could not be reached by interven-
tions in individual segments of the coffee chain.
Policies should aim at the enhancement of sys-
temic efficiency of the chain, instead of point
efficiency in international markets. A vertically
coordinated effort to share long-term informa-
tion should be made with the direct involvement
of leading coffee companies, other chain actors
and stakeholders. In these efforts coffee institu-
tions in producing countries should have an im-
portant new role in providing the public goods
needed to support growers and to adjust and dif-
ferentiate their products in accordance with the
trends of distant consumers preferences.
But first and foremost, an earmarked inter-
national taxation should be applied to the high
surpluses gained by downstream coffee compa-
nies and retailers to support the necessary ad-
justments to cultivate and market the coffee
wanted by final consumers in each chain.
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Résumé
Wim Pelupessy, Le monde derrière le marché mondial
du café
Les liens entre la production du café dans les pays en
voie de développement et sa consommation dans les pays
développés ont été l’objet de tensions fréquentes. Nous
recourons ici à une approche qui rend compte, de manière
globale, de la chaîne production-consommation pour ana-
lyser ces problèmes et proposer des solutions. Les désé-
quilibres sur les marchés internationaux de crédits spot
résultent de l’accès facile à la production et au commerce
du café, des inconvénients climatiques dont souffrent les
grands pays producteurs, ainsi que des décalages qui
existent entre l’offre et le goût des consommateurs. Le
recours aux fonds spéculatifs et aux contrats à terme sur
devises accroît plus encore la volatilité des prix. Les
grands torréfacteurs et détaillants internationaux contrô-
lent le transfert des denrées, les flux de valeur et d’in-
formation dans les secteurs stratégiques de la chaîne
grâce au pouvoir qu’ils exercent sur le marché et aux
outils de coordination dont ils disposent. Il en résulte des
prix élevés pour les consommateurs et très bas pour les
producteurs. La structure de gouvernance qui régit ac-
tuellement le système caféier n’offre ainsi aucune solu-
tion durable aux déséquilibres du marché et des revenus.
Il faut donc donner plus de poids à la coordination ver-
ticale en partageant l’information, en réformant les ins-
titutions qui régissent l’industrie dans les pays
producteurs et en introduisant des mécanismes de redis-
tribution des surplus, susceptibles de renforcer les mail-
lons les plus faibles.
Mots clés
marché mondial du café, chaîne production-consomma-
tion, gouvernance
Abstract
Wim Pelupessy, The world behind the world coffee
market
Linkages between coffee growing in developing coun-
tries and final consumption in developed ones have been
frequently under pressure. We apply a global commodity
chain framework to understand these problems and to
propose possible solutions. Imbalances on international
spot markets are related to the easy access to coffee pro-
duction and trade, climatic drawbacks in large producing
countries and supply mismatches with changing consu-
mers’ preferences. Hedgers and speculators in futures
markets cause additional price volatilities. Big multina-
tional roasters and retailers control the transmission of
material, value and information streams in the strategic
parts of the chain by their market power and extra-market
coordination tools. The outcomes are high consumers’
prices and very low growers’ prices. A sustainable solu-
tion for both the market imbalances and the asymmetric
income distribution could not be reached by the present
governance structure of the coffee chains. There is a need
for the strengthening of vertical coordination by sharing
information, reorientation of coffee institutions in produ-
cing countries and introduction of intra-chain surplus re-
distribution to support the weakest links.
Keywords
coffee, global commodity chain, chain governance
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